

# Security and Resiliency Guide

## Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)

### Annex for Lodging Stakeholders



Homeland  
Security



# Introduction

## Purpose

Bombings using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a common security concern related to terrorism and violence in the United States (U.S.). High-profile domestic incidents have occurred and international attacks are frequently in the news. Hotel and lodging venues are not immune from IED incidents, including bomb threats, suspicious items, and actual bombings.

This guide defines tasks and related processes that security managers and staff at lodging venues can use to understand and improve their ability to perform counter-IED (C-IED) activities and make decisions. This guide is designed to provide security managers and staff at lodging facilities with:

- 1) A practical framework to examine their ability to perform C-IED activities, and
- 2) Supporting guidance and materials to strengthen their C-IED preparedness.

As each lodging facility is unique in its size, complexity, and location, no specific guideline can apply to all. For that reason, the information provided in this guide is meant to provide suggestions and examples of what others are doing as options for facilities to consider to enhance their C-IED preparedness.

## Background

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) plays a key role in coordinating efforts with the public and private sectors, including lodging facilities, to build capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and mitigate bombing incidents. To assist stakeholders with enhancing preparedness for IED incidents, OBP and other U.S. Government stakeholders developed the *Security and Resiliency Guide: Counter-IED Concepts, Common Goals, and Available Assistance* (SRG C-IED). The SRG C-IED is a consolidated reference guide of C-IED preparedness information for homeland security stakeholders. It provides an overview of IED threats, a set of common C-IED goals, associated objectives, and practices, as well as links to Federal government C-IED resources.

This Guide is an annex to the SRG C-IED developed to support the specific needs of lodging facilities stakeholders. Lodging venue representatives, including security managers from several hotel facilities, participated in its development to ensure the Annex reflects common operating procedures and the most significant security concerns. Major associations and working groups also participated, including the Commercial Sector Coordinating Committee, American Hotel and Lodging Association, and the International Lodging Safety and Security Association. DHS conducted workshops to gain insight into security best practices, gaps, and potential products that would support C-IED preparedness for the Lodging Subsector.

### Benefits of the guide to the lodging community

This guide provides useful information to security managers and staff as they seek to improve preparedness at their venues. Through this guide, security managers and staff can:

- Gain a better understanding of their existing C-IED practices and needs;
- Obtain information to support preparedness efforts, such as risk assessments, planning, equipment purchases, and staff training; and
- Collaborate and communicate more effectively with their lodging counterparts, community first responders, and government agencies.



# Introduction

## Definitions

The following definitions may be useful to lodging security managers and staff as they read this guide and examine their ability to perform C-IED activities and make decisions to prevent, protect against, mitigate, and respond to IED-related threats.

- **IED:** A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract.
- **IED Incident:** Any event that involves a real or suspected IED threat, including IED detonations, bomb threats, the use of hoax devices, discovery of bomb-making components, or the theft of explosives or precursor materials.
- **Countering IEDs:** The interdisciplinary process for developing, implementing, evaluating, and adjusting measures to prevent, discover, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from IED incidents and their consequences

## C-IED goals

There are 10 common C-IED goals outlined in the SRG C-IED. These goals serve as benchmarks that stakeholders can review and consider for implementation in support of reducing the overall risk posed by IED threats.

### Goal

1. **Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities.**
2. **Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity.**
3. **Prevent the acquisition of explosives and explosive precursor chemicals used in IEDs.**
4. **Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents.**
5. **Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments.**
6. **Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs.**
7. **Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites.**
8. **Request Public Safety Bomb Squad assets to diagnose suspicious items and render-safe IEDs.**
9. **Provide IED-specific emergency medical response.**
10. **Reduce the psychological and economic impacts of IED incidents.**



# Introduction

The C-IED tasks in this guide align to six out of the ten C-IED goals in the previous table:

**Goal 1: Use and share risk information to inform IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities.** The C-IED tasks in this category include the activities by which lodging personnel use and share information to improve coordination between stakeholders.

**Goal 2: Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity.** The C-IED tasks that align to this goal include the activities to help increase awareness and preparedness for identifying and communicating IED-related suspicious activity.

**Goal 4: Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents.** These C-IED tasks include the activities by which lodging personnel strive to deter IED threats and protect against an IED attack to their facilities.

**Goal 5: Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments.** These C-IED tasks discuss various screening and detection methods that lodging personnel can utilize to identify and prevent IEDs and IED components from entering into lodging facilities.

**Goal 6: Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs.** These C-IED tasks include the activities by which lodging personnel can effectively respond to IED threats to their facilities in support of increasing safety, minimizing potential disruptions, and assisting law enforcement and first responders.

**Goal 7: Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites.** These C-IED tasks include activities by which lodging personnel can effectively and safely react at the IED incident site.



*Figure 1: World Trade Center parking garage following the 1993 bombing that killed six people and injured 1,000  
Property of DHS*


## Subsector definition

The Lodging Subsector is comprised of nongaming resorts, hotels and motels, hotel-based conference centers, and bed-and-breakfast establishments that provide travel accommodations generally for short-term stays and may also provide a range of other amenities (e.g., restaurants, golf courses, and conference and convention centers).<sup>1</sup>

## Lodging facility stakeholders

For the purposes of this guide, lodging facility stakeholders include the following:

- **Security/Management:** Employees or contract staff responsible for providing a reasonably safe environment for visitors, guests, and staff.<sup>2</sup>
- **Lobby and Front Desk Staff:** Employees or contract staff responsible for the reception desk, telephones, concierge, and bell stand.
- **Facilities/Engineering:** Employees or contract staff responsible for facility maintenance and deliveries.
- **Service Staff:** Employees or contract staff responsible for housekeeping and food service (e.g., kitchen, restaurant, catering, banquets, room service, and bars).



*Figure 2: Lodging facility stakeholders  
Source: iStock images*

<sup>1</sup> (Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan - An Annex To The NIPP 2013 - 2015)

<sup>2</sup> For facilities without full-time security managers, these activities would likely be accomplished by the facility manager.

## Assess IED risk

Knowing and understanding the specific risks to lodging facilities from IEDs is a necessary first step to selecting and prioritizing the C-IED tasks presented in this guide.

Risk is generally defined as the potential for an unwanted outcome from an incident as determined by its likelihood and consequences.<sup>3</sup> A C-IED risk analysis should address two core questions:

- How likely is it that an IED threat or detonation will occur?
- If an IED threat or detonation occurred, what would the consequences be?

As an example, a large downtown hotel in a major metropolitan area may be an attractive target for an IED attack because of the high number of people present at any given time and the relative ease of access. However, it is plausible that an attacker could use a suburban or rural motel, which likely has fewer security resources, as a staging area to gather precursors and build a bomb. As a result of these different risk factors, the large downtown hotel will have different priorities than the suburban hotel or the rural motel, which will affect the decisions that the managers for each of these facilities will make to strengthen the C-IED tasks outlined in the next section.




Figure 3: Example actions in response to a changing threat environment  
Property of DHS

Furthermore, any change in the likelihood of an IED incident (e.g., a credible threat to hotels in a particular city) could affect the actions those facilities take to implement C-IED tasks (see Figure 3). For example, day-to-day operations during the steady-state IED threat environment likely means checking guests' identification upon check-in to verify their identity. During an elevated threat environment, however, the lodging facility may decide to add additional security to monitor the lobby to look for suspicious behavior; and following a nearby bomb detonation, the facility may decide the risk is significant enough to physically search all guests before they are allowed to enter.

This section outlines examples of C-IED tasks that lodging security managers and staff can implement to prevent, protect against, mitigate, and respond to bomb threats and incidents. The C-IED tasks are grouped into the six C-IED goals defined earlier.

<sup>3</sup> (Risk Steering Committee 2015)



# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

Descriptions of each C-IED task include examples from industry documents and discussions with stakeholders that summarize a spectrum of approaches for lodging facility management to consider, based on their respective risks, as they build and/or improve C-IED preparedness over time. Following this section are three appendices:

- **Appendix 1** provides a broader list of C-IED tasks, to include the example tasks outlined below, in an operational checklist format for venues to use to self-assess their preparedness.
- **Appendix 2** lists resources available to lodging facilities to build and improve their C-IED preparedness.
- **Appendix 3** lists the references used to develop this guide.

## Goal 1 – Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities lodging security managers and staff can incorporate to effectively use and share information to any and all stakeholders involved.

### Assess risk of an IED incident.

Assess the likelihood and consequences of an IED incident that directly impacts a) the lodging facility and b) adjacent facilities (e.g., airports). A number of resources are available to support risk assessment of an IED incident, including the following:

- Local bomb technicians, who are part of local fire or law enforcement agencies;
- DHS Protective Security Advisors (PSAs);<sup>4</sup>
- Local emergency managers, as part of their ongoing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment process; and
- Local, regional, or state fusion centers.<sup>5</sup>

Be aware of new circumstances or information that may increase or decrease the threat of an IED. For example, a special event, such as a marathon or demonstration, could increase the threat.



### Example

Incorporate “alert levels” into facility emergency plans. These levels can be tied to local or federal advisory systems, such as the National Terrorism Advisory System, or to criteria defined by the facility. The plan can also outline specific protective actions for each level (e.g., increased screening of luggage during an elevated alert).

<sup>4</sup> PSAs are DHS representatives whose mission is to protect critical infrastructure through engagement with private sector stakeholders. For more information, see <https://www.dhs.gov/protective-security-advisors>.

<sup>5</sup> For more information about fusion centers, see <https://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers>.



# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

## Monitor IED-related security information.

Establish relationships with government and industry stakeholders to maintain the routine exchange of IED-related security information—including alerts, attack indicators and warnings, and advisories. Some examples of partnerships include the following:

- Private sector liaisons from law enforcement agencies;
- Local emergency management agencies;
- Local, regional, or state fusion centers;
- DHS PSAs;
- Local/regional hotel associations;
- National hotel associations (e.g., American Hotel and Lodging Association); and
- Local business associations/chambers of commerce.



## Example

Establish a periodic meeting of lodging managers within a jurisdiction to share security-related information. Invite local and regional stakeholders to participate and share information (e.g., fusion centers, PSA, and local law enforcement). By establishing these relationships when there is no explicit IED threat, lodging security managers will know whom to contact for information when there is a specific IED threat to their community.

## Goal 2 – Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities security managers and staff at lodging facilities can employ to efficiently recognize and report IED-related suspicious behaviors and items.

## Educate all staff to understand potential IED threats.

Train all employees and contract staff to recognize and report suspicious behavior and objects that could be associated with IEDs. For example, training for lobby staff could address not just unattended luggage, but also observing whether the owner of the bags then leaves the building. Training can consist of instructor-led sessions or computer-based training courses. In addition, educational materials (e.g., posters and signs) and checklists can help staff recognize and report suspicious activities and objects that could be associated with IEDs. Lodging managers can use drills on a regular basis to reinforce training.

If the threat is elevated (e.g., if an event involves a controversial figure or organization), consider issuing reminders to staff or conducting ad-hoc refresher training. DHS has developed a wide variety of materials, such as training videos, posters, and checklists, that lodging facilities can use to supplement their IED training efforts. See Appendix 2 for a list of available resources.



Figure 4: OBP Awareness Poster  
Source: DHS OBP



# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

## Recognize out-of-place and suspicious behavior.

Be mindful of out-of-place and suspicious behaviors that may indicate planning or execution of an IED attack. Some examples of suspicious behaviors include the following:

- Wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal explosives;
- Attempting to access restricted areas or events; and
- Conducting surveillance of lodging facilities.

If the threat is elevated, use daily staff meetings to reinforce the importance of recognizing out-of-place and suspicious behaviors. See Appendix 2 for more information on recognizing suspicious behavior.

## Recognize IED components and explosive precursors.

Be aware of common IED components (e.g., wires, timers, and triggers) and be able to recognize them in areas of the facility where they could be placed (e.g., lobby, banquet halls, and guest rooms). In addition, be familiar with explosive precursors, many of which are common household items, when they are in unexpected places or are unexpectedly missing from storage areas. Some common chemicals likely found in lodging facilities include:

- Drain cleaner;
- Paint remover;
- Sanitizers;
- Fertilizer; and
- Batteries.

If the threat is elevated, use daily staff meetings to reinforce the importance of recognizing IED device components and explosive precursors. For more information on IED components and precursors, see Appendix 2.

## Report any potential IED-related information to appropriate authorities.



### Example

Use incentives (e.g., a gift card) to encourage staff to report suspicious behavior.

Establish procedures for staff to report information to lodging security personnel and management on suspicious behaviors that could be associated with IEDs, such as targeted surveillance of a hotel, suspicious packages, or unattended luggage with no identified owner. If the threat is elevated, reinforce these reporting procedures during daily staff meetings. For more information on responses to suspicious behavior, see Appendix 2.



# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

## Provide evidence to law enforcement authorities.

Contact local law enforcement with IED-related information ranging from suspicious activity that may be of interest to law enforcement to a credible IED threat. Law enforcement agencies may request that facilities provide evidence (e.g., closed circuit television [CCTV] footage) supporting the IED-related information reports. For more information on reporting suspicious behavior to law enforcement, see Appendix 2.



### Example

Report all bomb threats to local law enforcement. With technological advancements, threats may be directed to multiple facilities nearly simultaneously, and the information can help responders build an accurate picture of the threat.

## Goal 4 – Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities that lodging security managers and staff can utilize to deter IED threats and better protect against an IED attack.

### Verify identity of employees and contract staff.

Lodging management typically require staff to wear identification badges at all times. However, the complexity of the identification badges varies significantly, from simple nametags to more sophisticated security cards. Consider implementing strategies to protect against the use of old identification badges to gain access to secure areas.



### Example

Change the color of visitor and contractor identification badges frequently to make it difficult to attempt to create fake badges or use old credentials to gain access into the facility.

### Control access to secure areas.

During the steady-state threat environment, lodging management has limited capability to control patron access to restricted areas (e.g., kitchen, laundry, loading dock, and security offices), as emergency exit routes often use those spaces. However, if the threat is elevated, consider placing additional security staff at the entrance points to restricted areas to minimize unauthorized access. In addition, consider requiring authorized personnel to swipe their identification badges to limit access to restricted areas (e.g., mechanical rooms, luggage storage, and security offices).

### Implement facility-related security measures.

Identify and implement protective security features, such as perimeter lighting, fences, and secure storage for explosive materials and precursors, based on identified vulnerabilities. In addition, consider installing vehicle or other physical barriers that provide effective standoff distance from potential IED attacks and implementing measures to mitigate the consequences of an IED detonation (e.g., restricting luggage storage to locations away from areas where large numbers of people congregate and installing blast-resistant windows and trash receptacles in certain areas of the facility). For more information on security measures, see Appendix 2.



# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

## Goal 5 – Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities security managers and staff at lodging facilities can utilize as screening and detection measures.

### Screen visitors and luggage.

During the steady-state threat environment, screening of guests and luggage is typically limited to visual efforts to recognize suspicious objects and behavior. However, if the threat is elevated, consider conducting additional screening of all patrons to ensure they have reason to be at the lodging facility and verifying patrons' identification to authorize room check-in. Additionally, consider implementing physical searches of bags and luggage belonging to guests checking in and other patrons visiting the lodging facility.<sup>6</sup> Examples could include adding additional security staff to monitor the lobby, using hand-held metal detectors at entry points, physical searches of luggage and bags, and limiting access to registered guests. Consider also the emerging challenges of guest verification given the use of mobile apps to check into and access guest rooms. For more information on luggage screening, see Appendix 2.

### Screen vehicles.

During the steady-state threat environment, screening of vehicles is typically limited to visual efforts to recognize suspicious objects and behavior, especially in city areas where efforts to screen vehicles would likely block traffic.<sup>7</sup> However, if the threat is elevated, the need to screen vehicles may outweigh collateral inconveniences. Enhanced vehicle screening could be as simple as adding extra security staff to monitor the loading and unloading areas immediately outside the entrance. For more information, see Appendix 2.

### Screen mail deliveries.

Lodging staff typically do not screen mail and other deliveries during the steady-state threat environment, aside from general recognition of anything suspicious that could be associated with IEDs (e.g., strange odors, ticking sounds, and protruding wires). However, if the threat is elevated, reinforce the importance of screening mail and other deliveries and reporting anything suspicious during daily staff meetings. For more information on screening deliveries, see Appendix 2.

## Goal 6 – Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities that lodging security managers and staff can employ to take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats and suspicious items.

### Search for potential IEDs.

Standard practice upon receiving an IED threat is to first try to locate the potential IED. If available, CCTV footage can aid in the search to determine, for example, if a suspicious package is merely an unattended bag or if it was left behind deliberately. If a potential IED is located through the search process, monitor the device, but do not touch it, until law enforcement arrives on scene. Importantly, limit the use of communication devices when searching for the IED, as the use of two-way radios and cell phones could trigger

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<sup>6</sup> Any efforts by staff to screen luggage would likely be done by physically opening and inspecting bags.


<sup>7</sup> There are some hotels in large metropolitan areas that search the trunks of vehicles parked in onsite garages.

# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

detonation of an actual device. For more information on search procedures, see Appendix 2.

## Determine and implement appropriate protective measures.

If an IED threat is determined to be credible, establish a cordon around the object to keep staff and attendees away from the area. Consider implementing the pre-evacuation protocol in the emergency action plan as a precaution. This includes conducting a secondary sweep for additional suspect IEDs along the evacuation routes and preparing reception areas. In the event of a successful IED detonation, keep attendees in their seats to the extent possible, given the concern of secondary devices along egress routes. If the decision is made to evacuate attendees, identify egress points as far from the blast as possible and direct the evacuation accordingly. For more information on IED evacuation distances, see Appendix 2.



Threat Description	Explosives Capacity	Mandatory Evacuation Distance	Shelter-in-Place Zone	Preferred Evacuation Distance
Pipe Bomb	5 lbs	70 ft	75-1100 ft	+1200 ft
Suicide Bomber	20 lbs	110 ft	111-1000 ft	+1700 ft
Briefcase/Suitcase	50 lbs	150 ft	151-1040 ft	+1850 ft
Car	500 lbs	320 ft	321-1000 ft	+1500 ft
SUV/Van	1,000 lbs	400 ft	401-2000 ft	+2400 ft
Small Delivery Truck	4,000 lbs	640 ft	641-3700 ft	+3800 ft
Container/Water Truck	10,000 lbs	890 ft	891-5000 ft	+5100 ft
Semi-Trailer	60,000 lbs	1570 ft	1571-9200 ft	+9300 ft

Figure 5: Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card  
Source: DHS OBP

## Goal 7 – Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities that security managers and staff at lodging facilities can utilize to safely coordinate the response to IED threats at their facilities and support the local emergency response community following a successful detonation.

### Implement emergency operations plan and/or business continuity plan.

Develop an emergency operations plan and/or business continuity plan to guide the response to a credible IED threat or successful detonation. At a minimum, the plan should outline procedures for the following activities:

- Reporting credible IED threats to local law enforcement;
- Searching for potential IEDs and what to do if one is located;
- Coordinating with first responders to ensure unity of effort;
- Providing information to patrons; and
- Evacuating the facility partially or completely based on an identified IED threat.

For more information on threat and detonation responses, see Appendix 2.




Figure 6: The Alfred P. Murrah Building following the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people and injured more than 500.  
Property of DHS



# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

## Share IED-related information in the event of an IED threat.

When responding to an IED threat, lodging management will need to notify and provide information to local law enforcement and fire rescue agencies, as well as their patrons.

- **Information to law enforcement and fire rescue agencies.** The types of information that security managers should expect to provide arriving law enforcement and fire rescue responders include the following:
  - Information collected on a bomb threat checklist;
  - Any suspicious activity or deliveries at the time the threat was made;
  - Information about the IED threat including whether the threat was made to a general phone number or a private number, the phone number that made the call, and exactly what the caller said;
  - Whether a search for the suspected IED has been conducted, and if so, the results of that search;
  - Size of any suspected IEDs located, as this will determine the area that will need to be cordoned off;
  - Venue floor plan, CCTV, and other electronic information that could be informative; and
  - Potential hazardous materials or chemicals that could affect responders or reduce the effectiveness of a K9 unit.

In addition, law enforcement officers often will want to speak with the person who received initial information about an IED threat, the manager (to learn about recent threats, firings, and any other employee issues), and the building engineer.

- **Information to patrons.** Seek guidance with upper management and public relations staff to develop information for patrons about a credible IED threat to the lodging facility or suspected IED within the lodging facility. If the decision is made to evacuate, patrons will need to be informed as rapidly as possible and provided with guidance on what actions to take. If the facility has available staff, knock on guest room doors to deliver instructions to face-to-face. Other options to consider include the use of a public announcement system, automated room calls, and blast text messages (provided that patrons provide their mobile phone number upon check in).
- **Information to media.** Seek guidance with leadership/management and public relations staff to develop a media relations strategy and/or plan about an IED threat/or incident or suspected IED within the lodging facility to communicate with patrons/attendees/guests, staff, and any businesses or residential communities in the surrounding area. Utilize news and social media and other communication mediums to share important information, such as stand-off areas or evaluation plans, to law enforcement, emergency responders, and customers.

For more information on sharing IED-related information, see Appendix 2.



# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

## Evacuate the lodging facility.

If an IED threat is determined to be credible, evacuation of staff and patrons may be necessary. Depending on the location of the IED threat, first determine whether the entire lodging facility needs to be evacuated, or if a partial evacuation is sufficient (e.g., if conference facilities are in a separate building from guest rooms). Consider developing an evacuation plan unique for IEDs, with several evacuation routes (including ones that are different from fire evacuation routes) in order to minimize patron exposure to a suspected IED. Ideally, inspect the chosen evacuation route before notifying patrons of the need to evacuate. First responders arriving to the lodging facility can also support the evacuation if additional personnel are needed.



### Example

Develop a specific evacuation plan for a bomb threat rather than defaulting to the fire alarm. Guests and visitors may need to be routed away from high-risk areas or to alternative rally points.

For more information on IED evacuation distances, see Appendix 2.

## Coordinate with first responders and provide support for response operations following an IED detonation.

If the lodging facility is located within the vicinity of an IED detonation but otherwise unaffected, first responders could request their support. First responders may want to utilize a lodging facility for the following:

- Command post to direct response operations, requiring conference room, office supplies, communication, and information technology support;
- Family reunification and emergency sheltering, requiring conference rooms, kitchen and dining areas, and guest rooms; and
- Medical services, requiring conference rooms, medical supplies, kitchen and dining areas.

Decide as soon as possible if the lodging facility is willing and able to support response activities and communicate that information to the first responders.

# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

## Relationship between C-IED goals, tasks, and stakeholders

The following table shows the relationship between the C-IED goals and example tasks described in greater detail above and the stakeholder(s) responsible for addressing them.

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Stakeholder			
	Security / Management <sup>8</sup>	Lobby Staff	Facilities / Engineering	Service Staff
<b>Goal 1: Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities</b>				
Assess risk of an IED incident	X			
Monitor IED-related security information	X			
<b>Goal 2: Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity</b>				
Educate all staff to understand potential IED threats	X	X	X	X
Recognize out-of-place and suspicious behavior	X	X	X	X
Recognize IED components and explosive precursors	X	X	X	X
Report any potential IED-related information to appropriate authorities	X	X	X	X
Provide evidence to law enforcement authorities	X			
<b>Goal 4: Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents</b>				
Verify identity of employees and contract staff	X			
Control access to secure areas	X			
Implement facility-related security measures	X		X	
<b>Goal 5: Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments</b>				
Screen visitors and luggage	X	X		
Screen vehicles	X	X		

<sup>8</sup> For facilities without full-time security managers, the facility manager would likely accomplish these activities.



# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Stakeholder			
	Security / Management <sup>8</sup>	Lobby Staff	Facilities / Engineering	Service Staff
Screen mail deliveries	X	X	X	
<b>Goal 6: Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs</b>				
Search for potential IEDs	X	X	X	X
Determine and implement appropriate protective measures	X	X	X	X
<b>Goal 7: Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites</b>				
Implement an emergency operations plan and/or business continuity plan	X			
Share IED-related information in the event of an IED threat	X	X		
Evacuate the lodging facility	X	X	X	X
Coordinate with first responders and provide support for response operations following an IED detonation	X	X	X	X

# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

The following image presents tasks for countering IED threats in and around lodging facilities.





# Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals

## Conclusion

Ensuring the safety of visitors, guests, and staff is a priority for all lodging facility owners and operators. By connecting with local authorities, developing plans to identify issues and support incident response, training employees, and reporting concerns to emergency authorities, many incidents may be mitigated or avoided. The preventive measures outlined in this report can help lodging facility owners and operators create a safer environment for their visitors, guests, and staff while maintaining an open and inviting atmosphere.



# Appendix 1: Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals and Tasks Checklist

This appendix contains a version of the C-IED goals and tasks in a checklist format. Lodging facility security managers and staff can use this checklist to evaluate their C-IED preparedness and identify areas for improvement. Consider the following instructions prior to beginning an evaluation of C-IED preparedness:

- **Select Tasks.** First identify which C-IED tasks are most relevant to the facility based on an assessment of the risk from IEDs.
- **Select participants.** Engage a subgroup of employees representing broad cross-section of functions (e.g., lobby personnel, facilities/engineering staff, and support staff) to examine C-IED processes and identify deficiencies.
- **Solicit responses.** Some tasks can be examined by one functional group; others require collaboration across functional groups. For those that require collaboration, gather input from all of the stakeholders that have a role in executing the task to determine a consensus for the facility as a whole.
- **Scope of the answers.** Considerable variation exists between different types of lodging facilities. For example, some have large conference facilities and ballrooms, while others only maintain small breakfast areas. Therefore, users of the checklist should think about how they want to be able to achieve each task and then assess whether they are able to perform that task successfully.
- **Use the results.** The information gathered can illustrate and enhance successful efforts, identify additional opportunities to strengthen C-IED preparedness and avoid redundant efforts. Additionally, a clear understanding of gaps enables managers to identify, prioritize, and justify key actions to take and equipment to purchase.



*Figure 7: Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar, Pakistan, following the 2009 Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) that killed 11 people and injured at least 50 others.  
Property of DHS*



# Appendix 1: Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals and Tasks Checklist

## C-IED goals and tasks checklist

The following table outlines a broader list of tasks, which align to the six goals described in the document in an operational checklist format.

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Response (Yes—Partial—No—N/A)
<b>Goal 1: Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities</b>	
Assess potential risks, including threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences from an IED Incident.	
Assess potential IED risks posed by facilities adjacent to the lodging facility (e.g., airports).	
Support local, state, tribal, territorial, regional, and national efforts to analyze and assess IED risk and resilience.	
Maintain the routine exchange of IED-related security information—including alerts, attack indications and warnings, and advisories—among government and industry stakeholders and nearby businesses.	
Monitor and act upon industry and government IED-related threat information.	
Report unauthorized access to facilities, locations, and events.	
Share actionable alerts and messages with employees, contract staff, and patrons, as appropriate, in the event of an IED threat.	
Communicate information and warning (e.g., protective measures for evacuation or shelter in place) to employees, contract staff, and patrons during an IED event.	
Report information on suspicious activity and potential IED threats to appropriate authorities.	
Provide information that could be associated with IEDs (e.g., individuals conducting surveillance) to local law enforcement.	
Provide evidence to appropriate authorities to support the collection of intelligence information with respect to potential IED threats.	
<b>Goal 2: Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity</b>	
Educate employees to recognize and report suspicious behavior, activities, and objects that could be associated with IEDs.	
Recognize out-of-place and suspicious behaviors (e.g., persons loitering in the lobby wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal suicide explosives or individuals attempting to access restricted areas or conducting surveillance) that may indicate planning or execution of an IED attack.	



# Appendix 1: Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals and Tasks Checklist

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Response (Yes—Partial—No—N/A)
Recognize out-of-place and suspicious objects (e.g., unattended packages or luggage) that could be IEDs.	
Recognize IED components, precursors, and suspect devices in common areas, guest rooms, and junctions where critical lifelines (e.g., electricity, water) enter and exit the facility.	
Recognize signs of guest rooms being used as bomb-making facilities.	
Maintain control over explosive chemicals and precursors of concern found in lodging facilities (e.g., pool supplies and fertilizer).	
<b>Goal 4: Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents</b>	
Verify the identity of guests to authorize room check-in, as well for access to special events as necessary	
Grant and control access to restricted areas, such as mechanical rooms, luggage storage, and security offices.	
Issue identification badges to verify identity of employees and contract staff.	
Develop and implement protective security features, such as perimeter lighting and fences, and barriers that provide effective standoff distance from potential IED attacks.	
Develop and implement mitigation measures and blast-resistant design, especially in high-risk areas, to limit the effects of an IED detonation.	
Restrict the storage of luggage to locations away from areas where large numbers of people congregate.	
<b>Goal 5: Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments</b>	
Screen patrons and vendors to ensure they have reason to be at the lodging facility.	
Screen vehicles upon arrival and in parking facilities to identify suspicious objects or devices that could be associated with IEDs.	
Screen luggage to identify suspicious objects or materials that could be associated with IEDs.	
Screen all mail deliveries, including envelopes and packages intended for the lodging facility or for guests, to identify anything suspicious that could be associated with IEDs (e.g., strange odors, ticking sounds, or protruding wires).	
Screen personnel prior to employment and/or use as contract staff.	



# Appendix 1: Lodging Subsector C-IED Goals and Tasks Checklist

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Response (Yes—Partial—No—N/A)
<b>Goal 6: Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs</b>	
Conduct intrusive and non-intrusive (e.g., use of CCTV) search and detection operations, as appropriate, to identify, discover, or locate persons or objects associated with an IED threat.	
Deploy assets (e.g., surveillance cameras and security personnel) to interior and exterior areas to interdict, deter, or disrupt IED threats from reaching potential target(s).	
Evacuate employees, contract staff, and patrons to a designated location in the event of a known or suspected IED threat.	
<b>Goal 7: Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites</b>	
Implement an established emergency operations plan and/or business continuity plan to support lodging C-IED functions/operations in response to an IED threat or successful detonation.	
Coordinate with local first responders during an IED threat or following an explosion to ensure unity of effort (e.g., lodging security staff should coordinate with law enforcement personnel responding to a report of an IED threat).	
Provide support for mass care services (e.g., family reunification, emergency sheltering) that are taking place inside the lodging facility following an IED explosion.	
Provide support for medical services (e.g., triage points, field care, or medical command posts) that are taking place inside the lodging facility following an IED explosion.	
Provide additional resources, as requested by unified command and elected officials, following an IED explosion to support response and recovery efforts (e.g., food/shelter for victims, families, and/or responders).	

## Appendix 2: Lodging Subsector C-IED Resources

The resources appendix provides a number of pre-existing guidance documents and products (e.g., posters, pamphlets, and guides) for lodging facility personnel who are interested in learning more about the C-IED tasks. Whenever possible, there is a link to the resource; to request those without a link (indicated with an asterisk), please contact OBP at [OBP@hq.dhs.gov](mailto:OBP@hq.dhs.gov).

Resource	Resource description
Identifying suspicious activity in a lodging facility	<a href="#">Awareness poster</a> that highlights examples of what suspicious activity could look like in a lodging facility.
Identifying ammonium nitrate and urea-based fertilizers awareness	<a href="#">Awareness poster</a> that highlights the IED implications for ammonium-nitrate and fertilizer products that could be found within a lodging facility and used in a bomb.
Identifying indicators of a bomb-making laboratory	Awareness poster* that highlights potential indicators what a room might look like when used to construct a bomb.
Identifying explosive precursor chemicals	Awareness poster* that highlights the IED implications for chemical products that could be found within a lodging facility and used as an explosive precursor.
Identifying hazardous chemical materials	<a href="#">Awareness poster</a> that highlights the IED implications for hazardous chemical products that could be found within a lodging facility and used in a bomb.
Identifying peroxide materials	<a href="#">Awareness poster</a> that highlights the IED implications for peroxide products that could be found within a lodging facility and used in a bomb.
AWR-333: IED Construction and Classification	75-minute <a href="#">virtual instructor-led training</a> that provides public and private sector individuals a foundational knowledge on the construction and classification of IEDs.
Identifying a suicide bomber	Awareness poster* that highlights the potential behaviors and indicators of a suicide bomber.
Identifying a VBIED	<a href="#">Awareness poster</a> that highlights potential indicators of a VBIED.
AWR-338: Homemade Explosives (HME) and Precursor Awareness	60-minute <a href="#">virtual instructor-led training</a> that provides public and private sector individuals a foundational knowledge on homemade explosives and common precursor materials that are used to make them.
Video training on suspicious behavior in hotels	9-minute <a href="#">training video</a> on identifying suspicious behavior in a lodging facility and the necessary steps for sharing information with relevant stakeholders.

## Appendix 2: Lodging Subsector C-IED Resources

Resource	Resource description
TRIPwire program tutorial	<a href="#">Tutorial video</a> detailing DHS's TRIPwire program and the variety of C-IED resources available and how to sign up.
Public service announcement video on reporting suspicious behavior in a hotel	30-second <a href="#">video</a> on the importance of "If You See Something, Say Something" in a hotel.
Bag check and suspicious item training	8-minute <a href="#">instructional video</a> on how to conduct bag checks and identify suspicious items.
Screening and searching vehicles	Vehicle <a href="#">inspection guide</a> that identifies safety procedures and best practices when screening vehicles entering your lodging facility.
Bomb threat guidance	<a href="#">Informational guide</a> to assist personnel in identifying critical steps and procedures to prevent and protect against a potential IED incident.
MGT-451: Bomb Threat Management Planning Course	8-hour <a href="#">in-person training</a> that provides participants a foundational knowledge of the DHS risk management process.
PER-336: Protective Measures Course	8-hour <a href="#">in-person training</a> that provides participants a foundational knowledge on facility vulnerability, C-IED protective measures, and strategies that can be used to mitigate vulnerabilities.
PER-346: Surveillance Detection Course for Law Enforcement and Security Professionals	3-day <a href="#">in-person training</a> that provides public and private sector security professionals instructions on how to detect hostile surveillance by exploring surveillance techniques, tactics, and procedures from an adversary's perspective; these skills enhance C-IED capabilities to detect, prevent, protect against, and respond to IED threats.
PER-310: VBIED Detection Course	8-hour <a href="#">in-person training</a> that improves participant's ability to successfully inspect for, detect, identify, and respond to a VBIED; instruction covers the VBIED threat, explosive effects, IEDs, and vehicle inspections, enabling participants to detect, deter, and protect against the illicit use of explosives.
AWR-348: Bombing Prevention Awareness Course	8-hour <a href="#">in-person training</a> that provides participants knowledge of general bombing prevention measures that aid in the prevention of a bombing incident, identification of protective measures, and mitigation of IED impacts.
AWR-335: Response to Suspicious Behaviors and Items	60-minute <a href="#">virtual instructor-led course</a> that provides participants an awareness of the indicators of suspicious behavior and the preventative responses to suspicious behaviors and/or items.
IS-914: Surveillance Awareness: What You Can Do	60-minute <a href="#">Web-based training</a> that provides an overview of surveillance activities and how employees and service providers can identify and report potential surveillance incidents.

## Appendix 2: Lodging Subsector C-IED Resources

Resource	Resource description
Training course on IEDs, package inspection and mail room procedures	2-day <a href="#">in-person training</a> that provides participants a basic understanding of explosives, IEDs; package handling, mail room procedures and bomb threats; vehicle bombs and inspections.
Video training on suspicious behavior in hotels	9-minute <a href="#">training video</a> on identifying suspicious behavior in a lodging facility to pre-vent or protect against potential IED incidents.
AWR-340: Protective Measures Awareness	60-minute <a href="#">virtual instructor-led course</a> that provides participants foundational knowledge on risk management, surveillance, and various protective measures.
Conducting visitor screening	<a href="#">Informational guide</a> that identifies best practices for screening visitors.
AWR-337: IED Explosive Effects Mitigation	60-minute <a href="#">virtual training</a> that introduces participants to the effects of an explosive blast and security measures and best practices that can help prevent or mitigate ex- plosive effects.
DHS-hosted Webinar on safeguarding hotels from the threat of terrorism	68-minute <a href="#">Webinar</a> that discusses the threat climate for the hotel industry and specific protective measures to take, including observing and reporting suspicious activity and items, as well as IED awareness and response.
PER-346: Surveillance Detection Course for Law Enforcement and Security Professionals	3-day <a href="#">in-person training</a> that provides public and private sector security professionals instructions on how to detect hostile surveillance by exploring surveillance techniques, tactics, and procedures from an adversary's perspective; these skills enhance C-IED capabilities to detect, prevent, protect against, and respond to IED threats.
Steps to take when receiving a bomb threat	4-minute <a href="#">informational video</a> describing what steps to take in the event of receiving a bomb threat.
Recording information during a phoned in bomb threat	<a href="#">Informational guide</a> on what information to record in the event of receiving a bomb threat by phone.
Minimum evacuation distance for an IED incident	<a href="#">Informational poster</a> that details the recommended minimum evacuation distance for IED incidents of different magnitudes.
PER-339: IED Search Procedures Course	8-hour <a href="#">in-person training</a> that provides participants foundational knowledge of search safety procedures and the opportunity to practice live searches of a facility, an area, and a route.
AWR-341: IED Awareness and Safety Procedures Computer-Based Training	60-minute <a href="#">Web-based training</a> that provides participants with foundational knowledge concerning IEDs and proper safety precautions and procedures for re- acting and responding to unattended and suspicious items.



## Appendix 3: Lodging Subsector C-IED References

The following is a list of references that informed the lodging C-IED tasks:

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- Joint Program Office. *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices Implementation Plan*. March 28, 2013.
- Washington D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency. *Security Guidance for Commercial Buildings*. April 2012. [https://hsema.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/hsema/publication/attachments/Security%20Guidance%20FINAL\\_0.PDF](https://hsema.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/hsema/publication/attachments/Security%20Guidance%20FINAL_0.PDF).